HomeMy WebLinkAbout1997/10/20 Board of Appeals & Advisors Agenda Packet
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Honorable Barbara L..
5064 State Capitol
Local Ordinances: Swimmina Pool Safetv - 111837
Dear Senator Lee:
QUESTION
Would a local ordinance adopted on or before January 1,
1997, that requires the installation of fencing at the perimeter
of a yard containing a swimming pool, but not a barrier between
the house and the pool or any other safety device, satisfy the
requirements of Section 115922 of the Health and Safety Cede?
OPINION
A local ordinance adopted on or before January 1, 1997,
that requires the installation of fencing at the perimeter of a
yard containing a swimming pool, but not a barrier between the
house and the pool or any other safety device, would not satisfy
the requirements of Section 115922 of the Health and Safety Code.
ANALYSIS
The Swimming Pool Safety Act (hereafter the act)
comprises Syctions 115920 to 115927, inclusive, of the Health and
Safety Code (Sec. J, Ch. 925, Stats_ 1996) . Section 115922
provides as follows:
"115922, Commencing January 1, 1998, except
as provided in Section 115925, whenevêr a
construction permit is issued fer construction of a
new swimming pool at a private, single-family home
1 Hereafter, all statutory references are to the Health and
Safety Code unless otherwise indicated.
--
Honorable Barbara Lee - p. 2 - 111837
it shall be equipped with at least one of the
following safety features:
"Ca) The pool shall be isolated from access to
a home by an enclosure that meets the requirements
of Section 115923.
"Cb) The pool shall be equipped with an
approved safety pool cover.
"Cc) The residence shall be equipped with exit
alarms on those doors providing direct access to
the poo l.
"Cd) All doors providing direct access from
the home to the swimming pool shall be equipped
with a self-closing, self-latching device with a
release mechanism placed no lower than 54 inches
above the floor.
"Ca) Other means of protection, if the degree
of protection afforded is equal to or greater than
that afforded by any of the devices set forth in
8Ubdivisions Ca) to Cd), inclusive, as determined
by the building official of the jurisdiction
issuing the applicable building permit_ ADY
ordinance Qov8rnina child access to pools adoDted
~ ~ D01itical subdivision 2n ~ before January 1,
1997, is 'Dresurned .t!2 afford protection that ~
eaual !g 2t areater than ~ afforded ~ ~ of
the devices ~ forth in sUbdivisions lAl ~ ~,
inclusive."~ [Emphasis added.]
Thus, Section 115922 would require new pools constructed
on or after January 1, 199&, at a private, single family home to
either be isolated from the home with a prescribed enclosure or
equipped with a safety pool cover, or the doors of the residence
that provide direct aCCess to the pool would be required to be
equipped with exit alarms or certain self-closing, self-latching
~ Section 115925 exempts public swimming pools, certain hot
tubs and spas, residential settings other than single-family
homes. Subdivision CC) of Section 115925 also exempts "(a)ny pool
within the jurisdiction of any political subdivision that adopts
an ordinance for swimming pool safety that includes requirements
that are at least as stringent as this article [act)". Section
115923 sets forth access gate requirements, minimum height and
vertical clearance requirements, gap and void requirements, and
other requirements pertaining to handholds or footholds.
Honorable Barbara Lee _ p. 3 - #11837
devices. Section 115922 also permits ~other means of protection,
if the degree of protection afforded is equal to or greater than
any of the devices" described in the preceding sentence, as
determined by the local building official issuing the bUilding
permit for the new pool. Finally, subdivision (e) of Section
115922 provides that any ordinance governing Child access to pools
adopted by a political subdivision on or before January 1, 1997.,
is presumed to afford equal or greater protection than the
alternative devices required by Section 115922.
This latter provision is susceptible to several
constructions. First, it could be construed to mean that any
local ordinance concerning child access to pools adopted on or
before January 1, 1997, WOUld be presumed to meet the requirements
of Section 115922 whether or not the required protection was equal
to or greater than the protection provided by the alternative
devices enumerated in Section 115922 and thus a jurisdiction with
any local ordinance adopted on or before January 1, 1997, relating
to child access to pools would be exempt from the requirements of
Section 115922. A second construction would be that any ordinance
adopted on or before January 1, 1997, concerning child access to
pools that is intended to prevent child access from the private
home to the swimming pool would be presumed to meet the standards.
Third, since the provision provides a presumption for these local
ordinances, it could be construed by a court to require that the
protection required by the ordinance, 1n fact, be equal to or
greater than the alternative devices enumerated in Section 115922,
and thus that the presumption could be rebutted it the other means
of protection are not equal to or greater than that required by
that section.
When a statute is theoretically capable Of more than one
construction, the courts look to that interpretation which most
comports with the intent of the Legislature (California Mfrs.
Assn. v. Public Utilities Comm., 24 Cal. 3d 836, 844) , and where a
statute is susceptible to two constructions, the one that leads to
the more reasonable result will be followed (MetroÐolitan Water
Dist. v. Adams, 32 Cal. 2d 620, 630-631). Statements in a report
of a legislative committee concerning the object and purpose of a
statutory proposal that parallel a reasonable interpretation of
the proposal should be followed (Beltone Electronics COrp. v.
SUDerior Court, 87 Cal. App. 3d 452, 455, at fn_ 1) . Statutes for
the protection of the public welfare are ordinarily to be given a
broad construction (Askew v. Parker, 151 Cal. App. 2d 759, 762) .
Exceptions to a statute are to be narrowly construed (City of
National ~ v. Fritz, J 3 Ca 1- 2d 635-636).
In this regard, Assembly Bill No. 3305 of the 1995-96
Regular Session, as amended August 21, 1996, was intended to
prevent the backyard sWiMming pool drownings and brain injuries to
Honorable Barbara Lee _ p. 4 - #11837
children in Cali~ornia (Assembly Bill Analysis for Concurrence in
Senate Amendments (8/29/96), at p. 3). The Senate Committee on
Judiciary also relied on California surveys o~ isolation fencing
requirements around the pool and noted that the most affective way
to prevent the most common death of young children in California
is to place a barrier between the home and the pool (Analysis,
Senate'committee on Judiciary (6/27/96). at p. 5) .
However, the Assembly Bill Analysis for Concurrence in
Senate Amendments for the bill enacting the act (A.B. 3305, as
amended AUgust 21, 1996; hereafter A.8. 3305) stated as follows,
at page 3:
"This bill does not establish a statewide
standard sinca it allows local governments to adopt
ordinances which provide equal or greater pool
safety. Nor does this bill establish minimum
safety standards since it grandfathers-in all local
ordinances adopted prior to January 1, 1997,
regardless of the level of safety provided_"
Section 115927 could be construed in a manner consistent
with this statement and provides that "[n)otwithstanding any other
provision of law, this article[act) Bhall not be sUbject to
further modification or interpretation by any regulatory agency of
the state, this authority being reserved exclusively to local
jurisdictions as provided for in subdivision (e) of Section 115922
and subdivision (C) of Section 115924." Subdivision (e), in
addition to presuming that ordinances adopted prior to January 1,
1997, afford protection that is equal to or greater than the
protections aftoråeå by the act, makes the building otticia1
issuing the building permit the local officer with authority to
determine whether other means of protection are equal to or
greater than that atforåed by the act. There is no subdivision
(c) of Section 115924. This erroneous reference would in our
opinion be construed by a court to refer to subdivision (C) of
Section 115925 which exempts any pool from the act if it is within
a jurisdiction that adopts an ordinance for pool safety that
includes requirements at least as stringent as the act (see
footnote 2). Thus, because local agencies are authorized to adept
ordinances that include equivalent standards and because no state
regulatory agency may mod1!y local building official
determinations under the act, it could be argued that the effect
of subdivision (e) coupled with Section 115927 is that local
determinations are not rebuttable and that the presumption in
subdivision (el concerning ordinances adopted prior to January 1,
1997, is conclusive,
If the presumption of subdivision (e) is conclusive,
then under the first construction set forth above, any ordinance
0 ~. -,
Honorable Barbara Lee - p. 5 - #11837
adopted prior to January 1, 1997, even an ordinance for perimeter
fencing, but no safety barrier between the private home and the
swimming pool, would be deemed to satisfy the requirements of the
act. Under the second construction set forth above, any ordinance
adopted prior to January 1, 1997, that is intended to prevent
child access from the private home to the sWimming pool would be
conclusively deemed to satisfy the requirements of the act if _
Subdivision (e) is construed as conclusive. However, this second
construction would not be satisfied by perimeter fencing because
the fencing is clearly not intended to prevent child access from
the private home to the swimming pool. The third construction set
forth above, of course, precludes construing SUbdivision (e) as
conclusive.
In this regard, while presumptions may be rebuttable or
conclusive under California law, Section 620 of the Evidence Code
provides that all presumptions established in Article 2
(commencing with Section 620) of Chapter 3 of Division 5 of the
Evidence Code "and all other presumptions declared by law to be
conclusive, are conclusive presumptions" (see Ch. 3 (commencing
with Sec. 600), Div. 5, Evid. c.). Because Subdivision (e) does
not declare the presumption it establishes as conclusive, it could
be argued that the presumption that a local ordinance adopted on
or before January 1, 1997, affords protection that is equal to or
greater than that afforded by any of the safety devices specified
by the Legislature may be rebutted by fact if a local agency's
determination is challenged in court. Under this construction,
the question is posed whether the installation of fencing at the
perimeter of a yard containing a swimming pool, but not a barrier
between the house and the pool, 1n fact qualifies as a safety
device governing child access to sWimming pools within the meaning
of subdivision (e).
This narrower construction of subdivision (e) and
Section 115927 more broadly effectuates the pUblic welfare
purposes of the act to prevent backyard pool drownings and brain
injuries to children in California. Moreover, had the Legislature
intended to make sUbdivision (e) a conclusive presumption that
same result could have easily been achieved by adding a
sUbdivision to Section 115925, the section that provides
exemptions from the act, stating that local jurisdictions with
pertinent ordinances enacted prior to the effective date of the
act (January 1, 1997) would be exempt. Thus, notwithstanding the
conflicting committee analysis, we think a court would conclude
that the subdivision (e) presumption may be rebutted and that this
construction best parallels the intent of the Legislature and
underlying purposes of the act. This conclusion in no way renders
subdivision (e) and Section 115927 as mere surplusage because
local building officials and local agencies still have sole
administrative discretion to administer the act unfettered by
Honorable Barbara Lee _ p. 6 - #11837
state regulatory agencies and previously adopted ordinances are
presumed to comply with the act, but an affected ·person would be
able to rebut that presumption factually.
We also think that a court considering the matter, while
narrowly construing SUbdivision Ce) and broadly effectuating the
purposes of the act, would conclude that its presumption is to be
construed as posited in the second construction set forth abovè,
but that the presumption is rebuttable. Thua, any ordinance
adopted prior to January 1, 1997, that requires safety devices to
prevent child access from the private home to the sWimming pool
would be presumed to satisfy the requirements of the act, but that
presumption would be rebuttable.
Finally, we think the tactual determination that
perimeter fencing containing a swimming pool does not satisty the
requirements Of Section 115922 best effectuates the purposes of
the act. This is because all of the safety devices designated by
the Legislature in Section 115922, inClUding an enclosure, pool
cover, exit alarms on doors, and self-closing and latching devices
on doors, have one !eature in common--they prevent a child's
accesa from the home to the swimming pool. Thus, we think that
the more reasonable interpretation of the Legislature's intent is
that a satety device that governs a child's access to a swimming
pool is only one Of several that has the capability of preventing
the child trom entering the pool trom the house and that the
installation of a fence at the perimeter of the yard containing
the sWimming pool in and of itself does not prevent a child's
access from the house to the pool.
Accorc1ingly, we conclude that a local ordinance adopted
on or before January 1, 1997, which requires the installation of
fencing at the perimeter of a yard containing a swimming pool, but
not a barrier between the house and the pool or any other safety
device, would not satisfy the requirements ot Section 115922 of
the Health and safety COde.
Very truly yours,
Bion K. Gregory
Legislative Counsel
By ~'J? fJ ~
Anthony P. Marquez ~
Deputy Legislative Counsel
APM:nd
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