HomeMy WebLinkAbout2022-06-27 Tech Privacy Task Force Post Agenda Packet City of Chula Vista
Technology and Privacy Advisory Task Force
**POST-MEETING AGENDA**
Date:Monday, June 27, 2022
Time:6:00 p.m.
Location:Council Chambers, 276 Fourth Avenue, Chula Vista, CA
Meeting Agenda
Pages
1.CALL TO ORDER
2.ROLL CALL
3.PUBLIC COMMENTS 3
Any individual may address the task force on any matter on the agenda or not
on the agenda but within the subject area of the task force. Speakers will have a
maximum of three minutes to provide their comments. A maximum of 20
minutes will be provided for public comment at this time. Speakers will be called
in the order in which their requests to speak are received. If, after 20 minutes,
there are still individuals in the queue to speak, they will be provided an
opportunity to speak after the business items have concluded.
4.PRESENTATIONS
4.1.City Department Briefings 7
The following departments will provide briefings on technologies and
privacy protections within their service areas:
Tim Jones, Engineering•
Harry Muns, Fire Department•
Tracy Lamb, Community Services•
Joy Whatley, Library•
Adrian Del Rio, Finance•
Victor De La Cruz, Finance•
Task force members will have the opportunity to discuss and ask
questions.
4.2.Debrief and Follow-Up Q&A from On-Site Tours 43
Task Force members will have the opportunity to debrief and discuss
their observations and ideas from recent on-site tours and
demonstrations by City Departments, including Police, Traffic
Engineering Division, City Clerk, and Information Technology Services.
City staff will be present to answer additional questions.
4.3.Ad Hoc STOP Chula Vista PD Surveillance Group 67
Representatives of the Ad Hoc STOP Chula Vista PD Surveillance Group
will provide a presentation outlining their proposed policy.
5.BUSINESS ITEMS
5.1.Minutes from the June 8, 2022 meeting
6.ADDITIONAL PUBLIC COMMENTS
Any individual may address the task force on any matter on tonight's agenda.
Speakers will have a maximum of three minutes to provide their comments.
7.STAFF COMMENTS
8.TASK FORCE MEMBER COMMENTS
9.ADJOURNMENT
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Technology and Privacy
Advisory Task Force
Chula Vista Fire Department
Resident Privacy Protections
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Discussion Topics…
•What kinds of personal data does the department collect or have access to?
•How is this information stored/managed/maintained?
•What kind of vendors or third parties have access to this data?
•What guidelines or policies currently exist to control and protect personal data?
•Can other city departments (such as PD) access this personal data freely?
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What kinds of personal
data does the department
collect or have access to?
Patient care reports
When the CVFD responds to an EMS call for
service, personal information is collected on
qualifying medical patients.
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How is this information
stored, managed, and
maintained?
Data entry via iPad in the field or
station pc.
The report is closed/locked by
personnel upon completion.
Access to reports is web-based. And
the website is secure, encrypted and
requires login/password by users.
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What kind of vendors or
third parties have
access to this data?
World Advancement of Technology
for EMS and Rescue (WATER)
Wittman Enterprises
San Diego County EMS
San Diego Health
Connect/SAFR/Health Information
Exchange (HIE)
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What guidelines or
policies currently exist to
control and protect
personal data?
WATER software rules only allow personnel that responded to the
incident to have access to the report(s).
Once the report is complete, only administrator access personnel can
reopen a report.
Vendor contracts:
•Wittman Enterprises –Business agreement
•WATER –contract, section 6 Confidentiality
•City of Chula Vista Clerks –Kerry will be presenting -Privacy of
Info Code 6255
HIPAA Training is provided to all new employees, and refresher training is
provided to current employees.
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Can other city
departments (such as PD)
access this personal data
freely?
No, only Fire Department personnel have access.
All other departments must request access with
cause.
▪City Attorney’s office –to comply with a
subpoena or if suit is brought against the
City of Chula Vista (NFIRS, PCR, 911
recording)
▪Risk Management –in response to a claim
against the City of Chula Vista (NFIRS and
PCR)
▪PD –for prep in arson case where our Fire
Investigator was involved (NFIRS) or
subpoena supplied for pcr related to case
▪Clerk’s office –in response to a PRA
(NFIRS, PCR, 911 recording)
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CHULA VISTA, CA
Introduction
Tim Jones, P.E.
Associate Civil Engineer
City of Chula Vista
Department of Engineering and
Capital Projects
Project Delivery Section
1City Department Briefing: Engineering
Overview
•Equipment
•Process
•Deliverables
•Data Retention
•Benefits
•Special Projects
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CHULA VISTA, CA
Equipment
•Two (2) Phantom 4 Pro v2 drones
•Two (2) IPAD Minis
•Software: DJI Go 4, DJI Ground
Station Pro, and Pix4D
•Drones are stored in Building B
•Access is limited by access to the
building
•Drone use is limited to individuals
with current FAA Part 107
certification
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CHULA VISTA, CA
The Process
1. Set and survey aerial targets >>
3City Department Briefing: Engineering
<< 2. Fly drone mission
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CHULA VISTA, CA
The Process (continued)
3. Prepare point cloud,
4. Extract digital surface model >>
4City Department Briefing: Engineering
<< and orthomosaic imagery
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CHULA VISTA, CA
Deliverables
Most CIP projects use the data to
produce background topology
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CHULA VISTA, CA
Deliverables (continued)
Some CIP projects use the data as
background imagery
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CHULA VISTA, CA
Data Retention
•Data collected/produced with
the drone is retained through
the life of the CIP it supports
according the City’s Data
Retention Schedule
•When a CIP is completed, data
is deleted and only the project
plans persist.
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CHULA VISTA, CA
Benefits of Drone Use
•Reduce the number of staff exposed
to hazardous environments
•Reduce the amount of time that staff
must spend in hazardous
environments
•More up-to-date than other online
resources
•Faster, more cost-effective, and more
site-specific vs traditional aerial
photogrammetry
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CHULA VISTA, CA
Special Projects
Occasionally projects come from other City departments
Data from these projects is given to the requesting department once compiled
9City Department Briefing: Engineering
Rice Canyon orthomosaic image for Public Works (above); CVEATC video for City Hall (left)
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CHULA VISTA, CA
Questions and Discussion
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City of Chula Vista Technology & Privacy Task Force
Summary of Questions and Answers from the On-site CVPD Tour
Questions about the Police Dispatch / 911 Center:
The Chula Vista Police Department operates a state-of-the-art Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP), or
911 center, as a part of the national 911 system regulated by the Federal Communications Commission.
The 911 center also serves as a radio dispatch center for various Police Department resources, including
police officers on patrol. The Police Department’s 911 dispatch center is a lifeline and conduit between
police services and the community that needs them. The 911 dispatch center uses a variety of
technologies, in accordance with best practices or regulatory requirements, to make it possible for
citizens to call 911 for help, and to dispatch emergency responders to their aid as quickly as possible.
• About geospatial data in the 911 dispatch center: What type of commercial or other external
geospatial (mapping) data is integrated into dispatch systems or other systems?
The dispatch center may use mapping data from a variety of sources. Mapping data is commonly
used by 911 centers nationwide to provide critical safety information so that first responders
can quickly locate emergency events or fellow personnel.
A common example of the use of mapping data in a 911 center is the geospatial location of a
911 call. In a world where consumers increasing rely on wireless devices, the ability for 911
centers to know the location of a 911 call can be crucial to sending help – especially when a
caller in unable to describe their location during an emergency. The Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) required all wireless carriers to provide PSAPs accurate location information
by 2012. The specific requirements are complex, but the FCC essentially requires that wireless
phones provide PSAPs with location information within a certain range of accuracy. The FCC’s
complete location requirements can be found at https://www.fcc.gov/.
In the event the caller is unable to provide their location (such as a child or person that doesn’t
know their location, a person being prevented from speaking, an unconscious person or a
person in an altered state of consciousness), the 911 center may be able to ascertain there
location using mapping data. This is commonly used to direct first responders (EMS, police, fire)
to the scene as fast as possible to provide emergency aid or other assistance.
Another example of the use of mapping data is the ability for dispatchers to see the GPS location
of officers in the field whose vehicles are equipped with GPS technology. The City equips certain
equipment with GPS sensors to monitor its location. Similarly, the Police Department equips
certain vehicles with GPS equipment. This technology cannot be disabled by employees. The
location information for on-duty police officers is generally available to on-duty dispatchers,
supervisors, and even other officers. The location information helps in the efficient dispatching
of the closest resource to a specific need. The location information also helps the city, as an
employer, to ensure that city employees are properly performing their work duties.
The availability and accuracy of location data in a 911 center can vary wildly by the type of
phone or technology used by the caller, the capabilities of wireless carriers, the strength of a
wireless signal and more. Some location data may still be available to 911 centers even if a caller
had previously turned-off location services on their device. But even that can depend on the
technical capabilities of the device and carrier.
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City of Chula Vista Technology & Privacy Task Force
Summary of Questions and Answers from the On-site CVPD Tour
For the Chula Vista Police Department, the most-frequent source of geospatial data is the City of
Chula Vista’s own internal geographic information system data (GIS). But some systems,
including Live911, may use other maps of their own.
Live911 provides dispatchers and officers with the geolocation of an incoming 911 call, and can
also stream the audio from the 911 call directly to officers in the field. The geolocation data is
visually displayed as a dot on a map contained within Live911’s web-based software. The source
for that map is under the exclusive control of Higher Ground, Inc., the corporate provider of the
Live911 service. We have contacted Higher Ground to inquire what source they use for mapping
data, and they informed us that their maps are pulled from ESRI/ArcGIS online.
• About dispatch operations: Tell us about dispatch operations. What type of information does
dispatch collect from incoming calls, how are they assigned to officers, and how long is that
data stored?
The Police Department’s 911 dispatch center acts as the nerve center for all Police Department
operations. Dispatch personnel answer all emergency 9-1-1 phone calls and all other non-
emergency requests for police service. The 911 dispatch center is also responsible for all police
radio communications, dispatching officers where they are needed, and coordinates
communication with a variety of other entities in the region.
The operations of the Police Department’s 911 dispatch center are similar to that of many
dispatch centers across the nation. In general, the duty of a dispatcher upon receipt of a 911 or
other telephone call is to collect as much information from the caller that is necessary to get the
appropriate resources to the scene as fast as possible, to help the situation. Examples of the
type of information collected by our dispatch center include the nature and details of the
situation, the location of the situation, whether anyone is injured or currently under threat, the
description or identity of persons involved in the situation, whether any weapons are involved in
the situation, and the name and telephone number for the caller in the event the dispatcher
needs to reach them again. Keep in mind that providing this information is entirely optional –
every caller is free to provide whatever information they feel comfortable providing, and to
withhold whatever information they want to withhold.
While on the phone, the dispatcher enters this information into a Computer Aided Dispatch
(CAD) system – software systems intended to assist in the dispatching of public safety resources
wherever they are needed. Other dispatchers monitor the CAD system and are empowered to
dispatch the necessary resources where they are needed. Dispatchers may request or assign a
variety of resources, appropriate to the specific facts of the situation, such as police officers,
supervisors, EMS personnel, firefighters, drone operations personnel, detectives, animal control
officers, regional PERT team assets, water control or water quality personnel, utility company
personnel, the Mobile Crisis Response Team (MCRT), and many more.
Resources may be dispatched over secure radio frequencies, by telephone, or by other digital
communications. The radio systems used for Police Department are secure and encrypted. In
addition, to foster interagency capability in the response to critical incidents and other
circumstances that impact more than one agency, dispatchers and officers are equipped with
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City of Chula Vista Technology & Privacy Task Force
Summary of Questions and Answers from the On-site CVPD Tour
radios that can communicate with a wide variety of local, state and national public safety
entities. Examples of these entities may include neighboring local police agencies, regional
firefighting assets, some state agencies operating in our region, and some federal entities
operating in our region. Some incidents require the rapid response by multiple agencies to
enhance or expedite emergency control of a critical event. Radio communications are the most-
common means to coordinate between agencies in these situations.
Dispatchers are highly trained professionals that have thousands of hours of specialized training
and are empowered with discretion to evaluate each situation, to determine which resources
are likely needed. Dispatchers are also guided by a series of state and national dispatching
standards, and by a set of Police Department policies. Lastly, all dispatchers and on-duty
personnel are monitored by a variety of supervisory and management personnel at all times.
Whenever a police officer is dispatched to a call, the CAD system automatically transmits the
appropriate CAD system information (generally all of the information collected by the
dispatcher) directly to that officer’s computer through an encrypted, private network tunnel.
Other 911 systems, including Live911, can also live-stream information about active 911 calls
directly to officers in the field using the same encrypted, private network tunnel. It does this by
transmitting an audio feed from the live 911 call through internal servers, which can then
stream the data over encrypted wireless communications to officer computers.
Law enforcement needs timely and secure access to services that provide data wherever and
whenever it is needed to help reduce or stop crime and victimization. The security and control
of the CAD system, the encrypted, private network tunnel, and all other systems that may
connect with it (e.g. other internal police servers, routers, network switches, fiber optics lines,
etc.) is governed by the FBI through a collection of strict requirements collectively known as the
Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Security Policy. The CJIS Security Policy integrates
presidential directives, federal laws, FBI directives and the criminal justice community’s Advisory
Policy Board decisions along with nationally recognized guidance from the National Institute of
Standards and Technology.
The CJIS Security Policy controlling document is a 253-page volume of topics that include
relevant laws, policies, requirements, proactive logging and monitoring protocols, auditing
requirements and many more topics. The Chula Vista Police Department is required to adhere to
the strictest requirements of CJIS Policy for all of its criminal justice systems. This includes the
CAD system and related networks.
Like all computer systems in use for public safety operations, data in our CAD system is retained
in strict accordance with legal or regulatory authority, and in accordance with the data retention
policies of the City of Chula Vista and the Police Department. Although these policies allow for
exceptions for certain situations (one example may include information that becomes evidence
in a court of law), the citywide retention schedule requires that CAD system data shall be
retained for a minimum of two years. The schedule does not specify a timeline for when CAD
data should be destroyed, and we currently have CAD data dating back to 1998. The schedule
requires that recordings of 911 calls are retained for a minimum of 100 days. The schedule does
not specify a timeline for when 911 calls should be destroyed. Due to the length of some
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City of Chula Vista Technology & Privacy Task Force
Summary of Questions and Answers from the On-site CVPD Tour
criminal investigations among other reasons, we have a practice of destroying non-evidentiary
911 recordings after three years.
• About geo-fencing: Can you describe in more detail how “geo-fencing” works and if there is
any data collection related to it? What is the range of a geo-fence that surrounds officers
when they patrol? Do officers use geo-fencing technology to execute warrants, conduct geo-
fence warrants, or to identify the location of a person?
Geo-fencing is a very broad term defined as the act of creating a virtual boundary line around a
specific geographic space. In simple terms, geo-fencing is the equivalent to drawing a box or
other boundary on a map. It is intended to “mark” an area on the map, such as the location and
perimeter of a crime scene, for a specific purpose. Examples include but are not limited to
marking the location and perimeter of a crime scene or marking the outside limits of police
beats. As it relates to police technology used in Chula Vista, geo-fencing is a critical component
to the flight safety of our UAS (drone) program. We use geo-fences – areas on a map – to
electronically control the areas where UAS devices (drones) can safely fly. Once enabled, the
drone software will automatically prevent a drone operator from flying the drone into or out of
a geo-fenced space. For example, we create geo-fences around large trees or tall buildings so
that the drone doesn’t crash into them. We also geo-fence the outer limits of where our drones
are allowed to fly in accordance with FAA requirements or other authorities.
Except as described herein, the Police Department does not otherwise use of geo-fences to
mark the position of officers or personnel. There is no geo-fence that surrounds officers when
they are on patrol. As previously mentioned, many police patrol vehicles are equipped with GPS
sensors that can relay the location of the vehicle through our CAD system. This type of
Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL) system helps in the efficient dispatching of the closest
resource to a specific need. The AVL information also helps the city, as an employer, to ensure
that city employees are properly performing their work duties. Some other systems, such as
Live911, my utilize the AVL information so that live 911 calls that are close to a particular officer
may be streamed directly to that officer’s computer.
The Police Department also does not routinely use geo-fencing to execute warrants or to
identify the location of a person. The Police Department may, when necessary for a criminal
investigation and acting upon a duly issued warrant, seek to use a geo-fence during a criminal
investigation (also known as a geo-fence warrant). It is also possible that, while responding to a
police emergency, an investigator or incident commander may elect to mark the location or
perimeter of the incident on a map for the purposes of managing the incident. But geo-fences
used in this capacity are not a part of any automated electronic systems in use by the police
department.
• About sharing information with other agencies: What types of information-sharing can be
done with County Sheriff, other police departments such as SDPD, Border Patrol and other
federal agencies? Are there any MOUs that establish these relationships?
The police department has a responsibility to keep the city safe and to respond to police-related
service requests of our residents, businesses, and visitors. The City of Chula Vista is part of a
greater San Diego metropolitan community. Acts of violence, theft, destruction and other
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City of Chula Vista Technology & Privacy Task Force
Summary of Questions and Answers from the On-site CVPD Tour
criminal behavior are not confined to the city limits, as criminal offenders may traverse in-
between city limits and across the entire region, state, or nation. The Police Department’s
criminal investigations often take our officers and detectives into the jurisdiction of neighboring
agencies to further or resolve a criminal investigation. In addition, the employees of other law
enforcement agencies may cross into the City of Chula Vista or any other jurisdiction for the
purpose of furthering or resolving their own agency’s criminal investigations. As a result, all law
enforcement agencies in the San Diego region have a long history of working cooperatively with
each other, along with a wide variety of local, state and national public safety agencies, to
investigate crimes or to apprehend criminal offenders.
As this relates to information-sharing or data-sharing between agencies, this particular question
as written is very broad and could cover an endless number of potential situations and
circumstances. If the context of this question surrounds immigration enforcement, we can
categorically state that the Police Department does not involve itself with the enforcement of
immigration laws, that no data is shared by the police department for that purpose, and that we
have always and continue to adhere to all requirements of SB54 and other laws.
The Police Department is not certain of the exact nature of this question as written, and may
therefore be unable provide a comprehensive answer in this format. The Police Department is
available to provide answers to more specific questions, or can provide further information and
context at a future meeting of the task force.
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City of Chula Vista Technology & Privacy Task Force
Summary of Questions and Answers from the On-site CVPD Tour
Question about the Drone as First Responder (DFR) Program:
The Chula Vista Police Department’s Drone as First Responder (DFR) Program provides airborne support
to public safety operations in a safe, responsible, and transparent manner to protect the public,
preserve the peace, reduce response times and increase overall quality of life in Chula Vista.
The intent of the DFR program is to get a drone on scene before responding officers arrive. Certified
teleoperators can evaluate the situation remotely and relay information to officers and field supervisors.
The drone can also feed live-streaming video of the incident to commanders and first responders. This
helps personnel determine the best tools, tactics and resources to safely mitigate a problem – often
before officers arrive on scene.
The DFR program also gives first responders real-time tactical information and even “eyes on scene”,
proving to be a powerful de-escalation tool. Since the program was first launched, there have been
multiple incidents where officers have scaled down their tactics and successfully defused situations with
reduced use of force.
• About drone operations: Tell us about drone operations, launch locations, and dispatch
criteria.
The Drone as First Responder (DFR) concept is different than traditional drone programs in that
it is proactive rather than reactive. Instead of launching a drone after an officer is already on
scene, Chula Vista’s DFR program stations drones at permanent locations throughout the city
and respond proactively to emergencies as soon as we are called about them.
The drones are operated by an experienced police officer who is assigned to remotely operate
the drones from the police headquarters in response to calls for service. From a resource
deployment perspective, the officer assigned to operate the drone, known as a teleoperator, is
no different than an officer assigned to patrol the city in a patrol car. The only difference is the
teleoperator’s vehicle is a remotely controlled drone rather than a police car. The drone officer
can be dispatched to respond to a call for service, and can also monitor calls for service on their
own and self-dispatch as needed.
Currently, the Police Department operates drones from four launch locations strategically
positioned throughout the city to maximize coverage area and minimize response times. FAA
regulations limit each flight to a maximum distance of 3 nautical miles from the launch location.
But each drone’s range is also determined by its battery power. On average, we have found that
drone batteries often provide 25-35 minutes of flight time. But that time can vary wildly
depending on a number of factors such as speed, wind conditions, and more. The four launch
locations are sufficient to provide aerial coverage over the majority of the city limits.
The location of drone launch locations are determined by a wide variety of factors including but
not limited to: a needs assessment, an assessment of current capability, distance between
existing launch locations, hazards surrounding locations, a review of crime and demand for
police services, the needs, capabilities, and cooperation with partner organizations, the
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City of Chula Vista Technology & Privacy Task Force
Summary of Questions and Answers from the On-site CVPD Tour
availability of space, cost implications, and oversight and management controls. The current
drone launch locations were selected based on a careful review of all known factors.
DFR operations are governed by a number of policies, regulations, and laws. The Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) broadly governs drone flights in US airspace. The Police
Department has several special certifications with the FAA, which also govern aspects of the DFR
program. Some of these certifications, also known as Certificates of Authority (COA), are unique
to Chula Vista’s DFR program. For example, the FAA has granted the Police Department a COA
that allows our teleoperators to fly multiple drones at the same time. Finally the Police
Departments maintains a comprehensive policy on drone operations which may be found on
our website at https://www.chulavistaca.gov/departments/police-department/department-
policies. The policies also outline a number of requirements for officer conduct and decision
making in response to calls for service or criminal investigation.
All police officers have some discretion to determine the calls to which they respond. The
teleoperator is no different, and also has discretion to respond to calls where the use of a drone
could help expedite the response of other emergency equipment or public safety resources,
could help get “eyes on scene” faster than ground-based officers, could aid in the active
investigation of a criminal offense, or where an aerial view of an incident can help preserve life
and/or property.
A wealth of information about the history of the DFR program, including the selection of launch
locations, may be found on our website at https://www.chulavistaca.gov/departments/police-
department/programs/uas-drone-program.
• About the selection and training of drone operators: How are drone operators selected,
trained? Are there any training or certification requirements to be a drone operator?
Candidates for our Drone as First Responder program undergo a difficult competitive process
intended to evaluate a number of factors before selection. These factors can include experience,
integrity, judgement, capability, education and training, skills and abilities, and much more. The
Chief of Police retains ultimate authority to select and assign candidates to the program.
All drone operators attend drone flight training. They must successfully obtain and maintain a
license by the FAA as a Part 107 Remote Pilot. In addition to the training and study required to
maintain a FAA Part 107 Remote Pilot License, all drone team members train regularly in a
variety of locations and settings to ensure operational efficiency. All training is documented, and
the records are subject to review by the FAA.
• When and why drones are used: Who dictates when and how drones are used? Are there any
limits on where drones can fly, or what types of purposes they can be used for?
DFR operations and all drone flights are governed by a number of policies, regulations, and laws.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) broadly governs drone flights in US airspace. The
Police Department has several special certifications with the FAA, which also govern aspects of
the DFR program. Some of these certifications, also known as Certificates of Authority (COA),
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City of Chula Vista Technology & Privacy Task Force
Summary of Questions and Answers from the On-site CVPD Tour
are unique to Chula Vista’s DFR program. For example, the FAA has granted the Police
Department a COA that allows our teleoperators to fly multiple drones at the same time.
All police officers have some discretion to determine the calls to which they respond. The
teleoperator is no different, and also has discretion to respond to calls where the use of a drone
could help expedite the response of other emergency equipment or public safety resources,
could help get “eyes on scene” faster than ground-based officers, could aid in the active
investigation of a criminal offense, or where an aerial view of an incident can help preserve life
and/or property. Police officers also have limited discretion to reprioritize their immediate
demands to meet the needs of our community.
• About drone data security: Tell us about the technology and policies relating to recording,
retaining, and securing drone video recordings and other drone electronic data.
Much like the Police Department’s Body Worn Camera systems, all DFR flights are recorded and
may be retained as evidence. DFR recording systems activate immediately upon launch , and
teleoperators are trained to begin using the camera as quickly as possible to zoom in and view
the area of the incident. At the conclusion of the flight and upon initiating a “return to base”,
DFR software is programmed to automatically tilt the camera upward and zoom-out to reduce
the chances that private property is accidentally recorded.
All video and photo evidence taken during any DFR mission is stored in the same manner and
location as Body Worn Camera (BWC) video and other investigative evidence. Videos and photos
are generally accessible to police investigators for official use only. Like all police records, video
and photos may also be subject to additional release under the same rules and restrictions as
BWC video and other items of evidence. Generally, UAS photos and video are considered part of
the investigative record and are not available to the public under the California Public Records
Act (CPRA) or Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
The Police Department utilizes a secure government “cloud” service, Evidence.com, to store
digital photo and video evidence. The service is authorized and certified under both state and
federal regulations for the security and protection of confidential criminal justice information
and is available only for official law enforcement purposes. Evidence is stored and saved for a
limited time (one year or less), unless it is categorized as evidence in an actual crime or formal
investigation. Then it is stored for a period of time consistent with all other evidence related to
that incident/investigation.
• About the selection of drone launch locations: How are drone launch locations determined and
approved?
The location of drone launch locations are determined by a wide variety of factors including but
not limited to: a needs assessment, an assessment of current capability, distance between
existing launch locations, hazards surrounding locations, a review of crime and demand for
police services, the needs, capabilities, and cooperation with partner organizations, the
availability of space, cost implications, and oversight and management controls. The current
drone launch locations were selected based on a careful review of all known factors.
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• About the contract with Motorola Solutions: Tell us about the contract with Motorola
Solutions regarding Motorola’s alleged use and sale of Chula Vista’s data.
This question appears to relate to the contract with Motorola Solutions for the Command
Central Aware software. This software is not used by the DFR program but is a part of our Real
Time Operations Center (RTOC). Please see the similar question under the RTOC section, below.
• About the information collected by drone flights: Besides drone video, what other information
is collected through drone flights, how is it secured, and is any of it accessible to the public?
Besides video or photo evidence, the DFR program also collects the following data about every
DFR flight:
o The date and time of the flight,
o The corresponding police case number of incident number of the call for service,
o The location of the call for service,
o The nature of the call for service, and
o The GPS coordinates and flight path of the DFR flight .
All of this information is publicly available through our website at
https://app.airdata.com/u/cvpd.
In addition, the Police Department maintains aggregate statistics about DFR flights overall. In
total the DFR program has responded to more than 11,000 calls for service, was the first
resource on-scene at more than 6,300 incidents, and assisted in the arrest of more than 1,300
suspected offenders. In addition, thanks to the DFR arriving first on-scene, its use has been able
to successfully avoid dispatching other ground units to more than 2,800 incidents, allowing
those units to be rerouted to other calls for service. All of this data and more is maintained daily
and publicly available on our website at https://www.chulavistaca.gov/departments/police-
department/programs/uas-drone-program.
• About the use of drones during mental health crises: How are drones used to respond to
mental health calls, in comparison to other resources such as PERT or the Mobile Crisis
Response Team?
Police Department dispatchers may request or assign a variety of resources, appropriate to the
specific facts of the situation, to any call for service. Resources may include but are not limited
police officers, supervisors, EMS personnel, firefighters, drone operations personnel, detectives,
animal control officers, regional PERT team assets, water control or water quality personnel,
utility company personnel, the Mobile Crisis Response Team (MCRT), and many more. These
resources may be dispatched simultaneously, as they become available, or as the situation
unfolds and their need becomes known.
A DFR may respond to a police call about a mental health crisis in order to provide ground-based
first-responders real-time tactical information and even “eyes on scene.” This can prove to be a
powerful de-escalation tool. Since the program was first launched, there have been multiple
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incidents where officers have scaled down their tactics and successfully defused situations with
reduced use of force.
A response by DFR to a mental health crisis does not otherwise have any impact on a response
by other assets, such as PERT or MCRT.
• About the use of drones as part of the Department’s mission: How do drones fit into the Police
Department’s mission and values of compassionate, community-based policing practices?
A safe and effective law enforcement response to an emergency so often depends on having
accurate and timely information. This has always been true in public safety but is even more
important today. Having better information helps first responders put the right resources in the
right place as fast as possible, resulting in a more effective response that keeps our community
safe.
The DFR program provides airborne support to public safety operations in a safe, responsible,
and transparent manner to protect the public, preserve the peace, reduce response times and
increase overall quality of life in Chula Vista. The intent of the DFR program is to get a drone on
scene before responding officers arrive. Certified teleoperators can evaluate the situation
remotely and relay information to officers and field supervisors. The drone can also feed live-
streaming video of the incident to commanders and first responders. This helps personnel
determine the best tools, tactics and resources to safely mitigate a problem – often before
officers arrive on scene.
The DFR program was created after national events demonstrated the horrific consequences
that can result when first responders are sent to a call without accurate, comprehensive or
timely information. The DFR program was created to address that gap. The DFR program gets
“eyes on scene” faster than ground-based officers, allowing them to see or hear about a
situation before they enter a danger zone. This type of real-time and first-hand information
helps officers to know if they need to speed-up their response to save a life, or can slow-down
their response to de-escalate the situation. For example, the DFR program has responded to
multiple events where the DFR video allowed first responders to know what an object in
someone’s hand was, before ground-based officers arrived and were forced into a rushed
confrontation.
Simply put, the DFR program provides first responders with accurate real-time information that
helps keep them safe, helps them better protect others, helps de-escalate circumstances, and
helps reduce the potential need for force. The DFR program also helps expedite the response of
emergency equipment or public safety resources, can aid in the active investigation of a criminal
offense to help reduce future victimization, and can provide an aerial view of an incident that
helps preserve life and/or property.
All of these factors and more and crucial components to effective community-based and
compassionate policing strategies.
• About the definition of “emergency”: What is the operational definition of “emergency” in the
use of drones?
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This particular question as written is vague and could relate to a wide variety of contexts. The
Police Department is not certain of the exact nature of this question as written. We remain
available to provide answers to more specific questions, or can provide further information and
context at a future meeting of the task force.
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Questions About the Real Time Operations Center (RTOC):
The Police Department recently constructed a new office and working space that we call the Real-Time
Operations Center (RTOC). The RTOC is intended to support the response to active emergencies and
criminal investigations. When not being used to support an active emergency or investigation, the space
serves as the day-to-day office space for the Police Department’s pre-existing team of crime analysts.
The analysts assist with crime analysis requests to meet the department’s needs.
The RTOC space has been constructed but is not yet in operation. It has yet to install the Motorola
Command Central Aware software that will facilitate the ability to combine real-time information in a
cohesive format for staff to utilize in critical decision making.
When operational and used for the support of active emergencies or investigations, the RTOC will
provide incident commanders and crime analysts with coordinated access to information to make more
timely and effective decisions, increasing the safety for officers, suspects and the entire community. The
intent of the RTOC is to help in the safe and effective response to emergencies and criminal
investigations by providing a single command location with real-time information. For example, the
RTOC is expected to provide incident commanders with quick access to GPS data about the location of
first responders, an overhead view of an incident scene from our Drone as First Responder program, and
the ability to hear incoming 911 calls in real time. The RTOC is intended to be a hub for the safe and
effective management of public safety operations and criminal investigations.
• About usage of the RTOC: When, how, and by whom is the RTOC used?
The RTOC is intended to support the response to active emergencies and criminal investigations.
Examples of situations where the RTOC may be used can vary but can include a major response
to a natural or human disaster, an ongoing critical safety emergency, a significant or unusually
complex criminal investigations, and more.
In order the manage the response to any public safety emergency, the Federal Emergency
Management Association has instituted the use of the National Incident Management System
(NIMS) by local agencies. One important component to effectively managing an incident is
command and control of responders. According to NIMS protocols, an Incident Commander is
designated for this purpose. The Incident Commander is usually a high-level manager or
supervisor in a public safety agency and has the responsibility to deploy a variety of resources in
order to effectively manage the incident. Resources may include first responders, public works
crews, firefighter personnel, subject matter experts, logistics management tools, working space,
computers and other equipment, and more. The RTOC is one of many potential resources that
an Incident Commander may utilize to effectively manage the incident.
It is also important to understand that the RTOC is not staffed at all times. Instead, the RTOC
may be “activated” for use when necessary. When not being used to support an active
emergency or investigation, the space serves as the day-to-day office space for the Police
Department’s pre-existing team of crime analysts. (In the event that the RTOC be “activated” for
use in response to an incident, the crime analysts may be directed with other personnel as
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needed to help staff and support the RTOC and the overall response to the emergency. Other
managers or subject matter experts may also be called to assist.)
• About funding for the RTOC: How was the construction and how are the ongoing operations of
the RTOC funded?
The construction costs for the RTOC came from the Police Department Asset Forfeiture Fund.
In terms of ongoing operations, it is important to understand that the RTOC is not used at all
times and not staffed at all times. The RTOC does not have an ongoing budget for operations.
The RTOC is merely a physical office space that, during normal circumstances, serves as the day-
to-day office space for the Police Department’s pre-existing team of crime analysts. Should the
RTOC be activated for use in response to the incident, funding for the entire response to that
incident (including any costs incurred by the RTOC) would be handled together. Generally
speaking, funding for the public safety response to any emergency comes from the General
Fund.
• About RTOC’s Motorola Command Central Aware software: What is the background and
operational status of the software used in the RTOC, and concerns about the software raised
by members of the public?
In order to provide more efficient and more effective situational awareness surrounding an
incident, the Police Department was authorized by the City Council to procure Motorola
Solution’s Command Central Aware software. The contract was first authorized by the City
Council on December 3, 2020. It included language that was later interpreted as possibly giving,
or appearing to give, Motorola Solutions or other vendors the right to store, share or use other
forms of “Customer Data” that could contain personal information. While the Police
Department and other authorities maintain substantial protections to keep vendors and others
from accessing or using any Police Department confidential information, the potential issues
and concerns raised by the community caused the department to work with the City Attorney to
amend the contract. The amended language was adopted administratively by the City on
February 17, 2022 and deleted the following statement from the contract: “In addition to the
rights listed above, Customer grants Motorola a license to sell an Anonymized version of
Customer Data for any purpose.”
The Office of the City Attorney has stated that all significant city contracts are always reviewed
by their legal group. This contract – and others like it involving data collection and usage – are
currently under review by a team of lawyers in the City Attorney’s office. Until recently, these
types of provisions had not been an area of focus. They should have been and now very much
are.
The Command Central Aware software is not yet installed. The software implementation project
is coordinated with Motorola Solutions and is fairly complex. The implementation project is
ongoing. We do not have a definitive timeline for completion, but progress suggests that it is
likely more than a month away.
It may also be helpful to know that the installation of the software is only one step in the larger
implementation of the Real Time Operations Center (RTOC). There are several more steps that
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will follow installation of the software. For example, our personnel will need to spend time to be
trained on use of the software, and our Department will need to draft procedures and protocols
for RTOC operations. In short, we estimate that full implementation and actual use of the RTOC,
including use of the Motorola Command Central Aware software, is still several months away.
Once installed, the Command Central Aware software is expected to take pre-existing content
that exists in pre-existing but separate public safety systems, and provide “one pane of glass” to
view that information. Although all the information in the RTOC already exists in the Police
Department and has been used for years to respond to incidents, most of the information is
contained within a variety of discrete computer systems – most of which exist in different
physical spaces. Without a “single pane of glass” concept, RTOC operators would lack at-a-
glance situational awareness of an incident, resulting in slower response times and strategies
that could be less effective or less safe.
When the RTOC becomes operational, the following pre-existing systems are planned to be
made available in the RTOC:
o Calls for service information in our Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system
o Live 911 – livestreaming 911 calls as they are coming in
o Local/international news and media channels
o Police radio communications systems
o Feeds from security cameras at the Police Department headquarters building
o Publicly-accessible social media posts
o Data about crime statistics and crime trends stemming from reports of crimes (the
Police Department does not use any predictive policing algorithms)
o The video feed from our Drone as First Responder (DFR) program
o Other officer safety and awareness content, such as “Be On The Lookouts”
The Police Department intends that any future technologies that may have an impact on the
privacy of our community will go through a public transparency and dialogue process in line with
city policies. We remain committed to engaging in dialogue focused on keeping the community
safe before deploying technology that may be perceived to infringe on privacy concerns.
• About the view of on-air news broadcasts: The RTOC has the ability to view on-air news
broadcasts. Is there a policy dictating what specific news stations may be displayed in the
RTOC?
The ability to watch live, on-air news broadcasts is among the systems available to the RTOC.
There is no policy that dictates which news stations may be displayed in the RTOC. As part of an
effective response to an incident, RTOC staff may view a variety of news channels or outlets and
would likely tune to whichever channel(s) are providing information deemed valuable to the
effective response to the incident. (Most-frequently local news outlets.)
• About the view of social media posts: The RTOC may look at publicly-accessible social media
posts. What social media account(s) are used to view social media posts?
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Like anyone or any organization, RTOC staff may view publicly-available internet resources
(Google, Bing, internet news, blogs, etc.) and publicly-accessible social media posts. No account
is needed to view publicly-accessible social media posts.
In general, absent a lawful warrant for a specific criminal investigation, the RTOC does not have
access to view private posts on social media or other private internet resources unless they have
specifically been shared with the Police Department.
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Questions About Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR):
The Police Department has operated an ALPR system since first authorized by the City Council in 2007.
The original system included three ALPR cameras but was expanded to four ALPR cameras after City
Council approval in 2011. The Police Department has continued to operate the four ALPR camera
systems ever since.
Responsible and effective use of technology is the third of six pillars as noted by President Obama’s
2014 Task Force on 21st Century Policing1. Technology provides agencies opportunities to better serve
their communities and enable them to solve crimes more quickly and prevent further victimization, as
well as create new pathways and connections with the community. Technology can change or adapt
rapidly and create both new opportunities and privacy rights concerns. Agencies must work to assess
and evaluate new technology and to develop and implement responsible and transparent policies and
protocols that maximize crimefighting and crime reduction in a manner that is respectful of and
cognizant of individual rights and privacy concerns.
ALPR technology has been in-use by law enforcement agencies around the world since at least 20014
and uses cameras and illumination to photograph a license plate and scan the image by image-
processing software that extracts the necessary data (such as license plate number and state). That data
is then compared against police databases such as lists of stolen and wanted vehicles. ALPR data can
also be manually searched by police investigators.
ALPR systems have become an accepted and proven tool for hundreds of law enforcement agencies
across the country. A January 2012 Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) Technology Summit in
Washington D.C. 5, showed 71% of surveyed police departments in the United States employed ALPR
systems to some extent.
ALPR systems function to automatically take a photographic image of the vehicle’s license plate,
transform that image into alphanumeric characters using optical character recognition or similar
software. The images taken often include the license plate as well as enough of the car to allow for
identification of the make and model.
The Police Department operates four marked patrol cars equipped with ALPR camera systems that
operate while the vehicles are in use. Patrol cars are assigned to patrol officers on an available basis and
are not assigned based on geography. Due to shift overlaps, patrol cars may not be used on some shifts
(i.e. a day shift officer drives one, making it unavailable for the next shift, but available for an officer on
the overnight shift to drive).
The department’s ALPR system has two primary functions. While the ALPR-equipped car is in use, the
system compares license plate numbers to one or more existing databases of vehicles of interest to law
enforcement agencies, and alerts the officer operating an ALPR-equipped car when a vehicle of interest
has been observed. This process typically occurs within seconds. At this point, the “automated” part of
the process ends and officers must then independently validate that the ALPR system has accurately
interpreted the license plate, validate that the license plate matches the vehicle of interest, verify that
the alert is valid (e.g. not expired or otherwise deemed invalid), and make an informed decision as to
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what action to take, if any. The ALPR system refreshes the comparison list every four hours to obtain the
most current information.
An alert alone does not justify a traffic stop or detention. The officer must conduct these verification
steps prior to any enforcement action.
The second function is the ability for officers to manually search the database for a specific vehicle
related to an official investigation (crimes, missing persons etc.). The department subscribes to Vigilant
Solutions, which provides data storage for CVPD ALPR images and allows officers to search for images
from the department’s images. Officers may also search for images from those of other law
enforcement agencies and commercial entities that have specifically shared with law enforcement.
Commercial systems are widely used by non-public entities such as shopping malls, apartment
complexes, home-owners associations, amusement parks, and parking garages. Commercial systems
greatly outnumber law enforcement systems.
This manual search function is the part of the system that is most invaluable to the department as it
used in almost every investigation conducted. There are hundreds of instances where cases would not
be solved without the use of the ALPR system.
• About safety of the ALPR system: How does the ALPR system function in partnership with
existing databases, and what safeguards and protocols are in place to mitigate privacy or
enforcement concerns? How is the system managed, and used by CVPD?
The CVPD ALPR system is a stand-alone system. ALPR data is stored only within the ALPR
system, which is a secured, Government approved secure server. ALPR data is protected from
disclosure to anyone outside of law enforcement by state law. Additionally, CVPD has chosen to
restrict access of our data exclusively to California law enforcement agencies who are bound by
SB54 to prevent immigration enforcement. As a matter of routine practice the Police
Department does not share ALPR data with any federal agency or fusion center.
As it relates to ALPR data, the concept of data sharing is best described as follows: If another law
enforcement agency is investigating a crime and searching for an involved vehicle, and that
vehicle’s license plate was detected and photographed by one of CVPD’s four patrol car-
mounted ALPR camera systems within the past 365 days, then the image and license plate of
that vehicle will be included in the search results for the other agency. Conversely, if the
vehicle’s license plate was not detected and photographed in CVPD’s ALPR database, then
nothing from CVPD’s ALPR data would be shared with the other agency.
CVPD’s ALPR system only takes a photograph of a vehicle after the vehicle-mounted system
software detects a license plate within the scope and focus of the ALPR cameras (this range is
generally out to 12-15’ from the patrol car). Once the system recognizes a license plate number,
the system takes a photograph of the license plate and vehicle. That photo, along with the date,
time and location of the photograph, is stored in the ALPR system. The system does not record
video or constantly take photographs.
One feature of the ALPR system is that it is able to compare detected license plates with pre-
existing law enforcement databases that include stolen cars, stolen license plates, cars
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associated with crimes or with persons of interest in criminal investigations (e.g. wanted
vehicles). In the event a detected license plate matches that of a wanted vehicle, the system
sends an alert to the officer driving the ALPR-equipped police car that a wanted vehicle may
have been detected nearby. Upon receiving the alert, officers must verify that the alert is valid,
locate the car, and determine what course of action to take (if any). Nothing precludes the
officer from calling upon other officers to help. An ALPR alert by itself is not enough for an
officer to stop the car, detain occupants, or take any other enforcement action.
Another safeguard built into the ALPR system is that it refreshes the database of wanted
vehicles every four hours. This helps prevent an alert from being sent for a vehicle that is no
longer wanted. Alerts are not saved in the system and cannot be researched retroactively.
The Police Department’s ALPR data is maintained for 365 days. Images are automatically deleted
one year from the date they are taken. The Department conducts regular audits to verify that no
data exists beyond 365 days.
Within the law enforcement profession, different agencies may maintain ALPR data for different
time periods. For example, some agencies retain data for two years or more. The California
Highway Patrol is limited by state statute to a 60-day retention period. Many of our criminal
investigations are complex and lengthy in nature, often extending in excess of a year. It’s not
uncommon for new investigative leads to surface months or years later. Access to ALPR
information in these types of cases can be a crucial link to the investigation and help detectives
locate offenders. Due to the nature and complexity of the steps and processes involved in each
criminal investigation, it’s not practical for the Police Department to track quantitative data
about ALPR’s use in criminal investigations. This is similarly true for other functions of the
department where the sheer volume and complexity of tasks lack practical feasibility to
quantitatively track.
The Police Department’s ALPR policy is publicly available on our website at
https://www.chulavistaca.gov/departments/police-department/department-policies. In
addition, the ALPR administrative team performs quarterly audits of the system and audits are
also posted to our website at https://www.chulavistaca.gov/departments/police-
department/about-us/transparency-and-accountability/automated-license-plate-readers-alpr.
• About the use of ALPR cars: How are the ALPR cars used or deployed by the department?
The Police Department operates four ALPR systems that are mounted on four marked patrol
cars (although currently only three cars are in use due to a mechanical issue with the fourth
vehicle). These patrol cars are part of our standard marked patrol fleet, which consists of 50
vehicles (only 45 of which are operational as of June 16, 2022). The cars are shared by our
patrol shifts.
Our patrol shifts overlap each other by several hours. Because there aren’t enough cars to go
around, cars are checked-out by individual officers as they are available. (Sometimes officers
are unable to go into the field due to a lack of cars.) Officers in patrol are assigned to any one of
a variety of patrol beats. Officers spend much of their shift in their assigned areas, being
dispatched to calls for service or otherwise responding to the needs of the community.
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Officers driving ALPR-equipped cars use them like normal patrol vehicles – to patrol their
assigned area and respond to calls for service. The limited number of ALPR-equipped vehicles,
coupled with the nature of the demand for police services throughout the city, prevents the
Police Department from deploying ALPR cars to specific areas of the city. In addition, the Police
Department does not deploy ALPR cars for the specific purpose of creating ALPR data.
The Police Department inspects “density maps” each quarter, which provide a visual depiction
of where in the city ALPR license plates are scanned. We have found that density maps
consistently match other heat maps that depict where the most demand for police calls for
service originate from. The majority of these community-driven calls for service originate in the
western region of Chula Vista.
• About the effectiveness of the ALPR system: How do you measure the effectiveness of the
ALPR system?
Tracking ALPR success stories or the number of cases solved is highly complex. ALPR data can
only be used under strict policy controls and only where a detective has a legal right to use the
data, and the use of the data is necessary for an official law enforcement purpose. But ALPR
data by itself does not solve crimes. ALPR data is just one among many tools that our officers
and detectives may utilize to help them identify vehicles of interest during a criminal
investigation, or to help eliminate a potential vehicle from suspicion. Simply put, ALPR data may
help to narrow an investigation by providing a resource to investigate the potential presence of
related vehicles (or lack thereof) in relation to the location and time of a specific crime. But ALPR
data alone is unlikely to be the sole reason for solving a crime.
Tracking the usage of any of these tools is not practical. About 25,000 crimes are reported to the
Police Department each year. Each one of these crimes must be investigated, and the
department maintains a small complement of about 43 sworn detectives. Many investigations
take dozens of hours of investigative work, and some investigations take hundreds. It is neither
practical or efficient for the investigative division to track quantitative data about each
individual action, database search, or other investigative step in every case under investigation.
This would be especially time consuming for each detective, who may have a simultaneous
workload of 30-60 ongoing investigations representing countless victims in our community
seeking justice. As a result, the Police Department does not make it a practice to track the types
of minute details for many investigative processes for reasons of practicality.
The Police Department maintains strict policies that govern the security and control over
confidential data, including ALPR data. Police Department supervisors and professional staff
review and audit the use of confidential police systems. In addition, external audits are
conducted each year by a number of external authorities such as the California Department of
Justice of the FBI. To date, the Police Department is not aware of a single breach of data security
policies or protocols as they relate to ALPR data.
Throughout the state of California police officers are held to similar standards and regulatory
controls that relate to the security of information. While the Chula Vista Police Department is
not empowered to conduct administrative investigations into allegations of misconduct by the
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personnel of other law enforcement agencies, several policies and laws within the state help
insure employee accountability. Should the Police Department become aware of an
inappropriate or systemic breach of policy or trust by any agency, we could take several steps to
protect our data such as alerting other authorities or shutting-off access to our systems and
data.
The ALPR administrative team, acting under the authority of the Chief of Police, controls which
agencies the Police Department shares ALPR data with. (Keep in mind that sharing, as used
herein, only means that CVPD’s ALPR data will be included in an agency’s search for a particular
license plate.) The list of agencies that the Police Department shares with is publicly available on
our website at we share data with is published on our website at
https://www.chulavistaca.gov/departments/police-department/about-us/transparency-and-
accountability/automated-license-plate-readers-alpr. The list may be updated periodically when
a new agency has begun to use the ALPR system, request sharing of our data, is approved by the
ALPR administrative team, and we specifically authorize sharing by our system. Anytime the list
is updated, the ALPR administrative team posts an updated version of the list to the website. As
part of the audit process, the ALPR administrative team verifies that no agency outside our
agreement is accessing our data.
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Other Questions:
• Where do the funds come from for each of the technologies shown?
Funding sources for all City processes and products can vary wildly. The Police Department may
utilize a number of budget accounts for different projects, that may include but are not
necessarily limited to the General Fund, Asset Forfeiture Fund, a variety of grant funds, and
more. The specific budget account for any specific technology acquisition is a matter of public
record, and the City Council requires that fiscal impacts for any significant expenditure are made
a part of its public deliberations.
• What data is shared with DHS fusion centers, and how does that sharing happen? To what
extent does CVPD participate in the San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center? How
does CVPD share data in the San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center? Does CVPD
participate in any other DHS fusion centers?
This question as written is very broad. Generally speaking, the Police Department may share
specific and independent information related to criminal activity and criminal investigations with
the San Diego Fusion Center. The Police Department does not maintain any systems that
routinely or automatically share data with any Fusion Center. The Police Department does not
collect nor share immigration information. We do not play a direct role in any other Fusion
Centers, and only collaborate when criminal investigations and information crosses jurisdictions
and coordination between jurisdictions may be assisted by the Fusion Center. Any information
shared at that time is information deemed critical to safe and effective public safety operations.
• What are the decision-making processes during procurement?
Procurement protocols are managed by the City of Chula Vista Department of Finance under the
direction of City Administration and City Council. The Police Department, like all other city
departments, adheres to all procurement policies and protocols required by the Finance
Department.
• Do all officers wear body cameras when interacting with the public?
Yes. Body worn cameras (BWC) are issued to all uniformed officers and detectives. They are
required to be worn and utilized while on-duty in the field. According to departmental policy,
employees are directed to activate BWC in a number of circumstances, including whenever
anticipate enforcement action or investigative contacts are about to take place. The policy on
BWC is contained in the Police Department’s policy manual, publicly available on our website at
https://www.chulavistaca.gov/departments/police-department/department-policies.
• Is the Police Department subject to the City’s data retention policies?
Yes, in addition to any other data retention requirements or restrictions based on proper legal
or regulatory authority.
DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 63 of 107
City of Chula Vista Technology & Privacy Task Force
Summary of Questions and Answers from the On-site CVPD Tour
• Does the Police Department have a policy for sharing data with third parties, such as someone
who requests data for academic research purposes?
Requests for information or data in these circumstances are handled pursuant to the California
Public Records Act (CPRA) and/or the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The City of
Chula Vista complies with all requirements and restrictions of both acts. In addition, for requests
that are filed outside those two acts, the Police Department and the Chief of Police have
discretion in selecting whether it will participate in a research study. That decision may be based
on a variety of factors, including current workload and capacity to participate, legal limitations
or prohibitions against sharing data, the impact that sharing information could have on our
community, value of the potential research or study, and much more.
• Where is the primary data stored – locally or in the cloud?
All electronic data in storage for the Police Department is either stored on-site in systems
controlled by city employees, or in secure cloud-based systems. Any cloud-based system that
contains confidential information must be governed and certified by the FBI through a collection
of strict requirements collectively known as the Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS)
Security Policy. The CJIS Security Policy integrates presidential directives, federal laws, FBI
directives and the criminal justice community’s Advisory Policy Board decisions along with
nationally recognized guidance from the National Institute of Standards and Technology.
The CJIS Security Policy controlling document is a 253-page volume of topics that include
relevant laws, policies, requirements, proactive logging and monitoring protocols, auditing
requirements and many more topics. The Chula Vista Police Department and all applicable
cloud-based service providers are required to adhere to the strictest requirements of CJIS Policy
for all of its criminal justice systems.
• Can you provide an inventory of the systems the Police Department uses to collect and
manage data?
The Police Department maintains servers and systems for a wide variety of purposes, including
such things as logging door locking mechanisms, tracking the HVAC status and temperature of
office spaces in the facility, recording 911 calls, maintaining payroll records, keeping records of
inmates booked into the jail, keeping both digital and hard-copy records of police reports and
related investigations, maintaining recordings of internal facility security cameras, and much
more. The question as written is very broad, and the Police Department needs more clarification
about the types of systems or types of data that the inquiry surrounds.
• Beyond the security policies of the cloud provider, what data protection policies does the
Police Department have of its own?
The Police Department has a significant number of specific data protection and security policies
and practices. In addition, all electronic data in storage for the Police Department is also
controlled by server-based automation policies. Lastly, all systems that contain confidential
information are governed by the FBI through a collection of strict requirements collectively
known as the Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Security Policy.
DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 64 of 107
City of Chula Vista Technology & Privacy Task Force
Summary of Questions and Answers from the On-site CVPD Tour
The question as written is very broad. The total summation of data protection policies would be
voluminous (exceeding many hundreds of pages). Without greater clarity or specificity, the
Police Department is unable to provide a comprehensive answer in this format. But the entire
Police Department policy manual is publicly available on our website at
https://www.chulavistaca.gov/departments/police-department/department-policies.
• Are there any written policies that preclude or limit the purchase or use of particular types of
technology by CVPD?
Yes. There are a combination of internal policies and legislative or regulatory requirements that
limit the purchase or use of certain types of technologies. For example, state law prohibits the
use of automated facial recognition by police officers, controls the procurement and use of
military equipment, and internal policy prohibits the use of systems for immigration
enforcement.
The Police Department looks forward to working with the Task Force to derive policy
recommendations that guide the potential procurement or use of future technologies.
• Is there an auditing process to review procurement of contracts?
Yes, all procurements are controlled by the Finance Department and all city contracts are
reviewed by the City Attorney. All significant contracts also undergo review by the City Council.
• If so, does that auditing process specify/address any of the following:
o Appropriateness and justification of procurement
o Impact on privacy concerns and balance on civil liberties
o Cost-effectiveness and efficient spending of public funds
o Effectiveness – degree of achievement of the set objectives
o Transparent spending of public funds
It is our understanding that existing processes include measures for all of the above. For greater
detail, please refer to the Department of Finance and the Office of the City Attorney.
• Chief Kennedy spoke of “Community Policing” and “Compassionate Policing” during the Task
Force tour, as approaches to policing CVPD aspires to. How can CVPD achieve this with such an
extensive reliance on surveillance technology?
While the safe, reasonable, and effective application of modern technologies is important to
public safety, the Police Department does not rely on surveillance technologies at all.
Technologies in-use by the Police Department are not intended nor used to surveil our
community, and are merely among many tools and strategies that the Police Department may
use to enhance its community policing mission. The vast majority of technologies currently in-
use by the Police Department are not classified as surveillance at all, and their use has been a
proven and effective practice implemented by public safety agencies across the nation and
around the world. Most of these technologies have been utilized by countless public safety
DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 65 of 107
City of Chula Vista Technology & Privacy Task Force
Summary of Questions and Answers from the On-site CVPD Tour
agencies for decades, are well known to the greater community, and are widely considered
“best practice” for professional and effective public safety agencies.
Generally speaking, the Police Department currently uses only two specific technologies that are
unique to Chula Vista: The Drone as First Responder Program (DFR) and the Live911 system. In
both cases, as in all cases of technology used by the Police Department, the intent and purpose
of these two technologies is to enhance the Department’s community policing mission. For
example, DFR has helped officers successfully de-escalate numerous situations or solve
countless crimes. It has been described as one of the best de-escalation tools in modern
existence. Similarly, Live911 gives officers the ability to help victims faster and with better
information about what those victims are experiencing.
In general, community policing and compassionate policing are core to the Police Department’s
mission, and we utilizes technologies like DFR and Live911 to enhance that core.
• Which privacy and tech use policies were in force PRIOR TO introduction of each type of
technology in Chula Vista - specifically, ALPR, body cameras, drones, heat sensors, social
media scanning, Real Time Operations Center, etc.? Who has been providing oversight for
each program?
Whenever the Police Department considers the deployment or application of any specific tool or
technology, that deployment is usually proceeded by the development and implementation of
training and policy. Of the specific technologies mentioned in this question, policies were
created for ALPR, body worn cameras, and drones before those tools were ever introduced. In
the case of the Real Time Operations Center (RTOC), the RTOC has yet to be implemented. The
Police Department anticipates developing training and protocols before the RTOC is
implemented. The Police Department does not engage in social media scanning, but may view
publicly-available social media posts just like any other person or entity. In general, there are no
policy requirements governing any person’s ability look at public social media posts. Except for
infrared cameras manually used by personnel in response to critical operations (search-and-
rescue, DFR, SWAT, etc.), the Police Department does deploy or use heat sensors.
• How often are audits conducted for each program and where are these audits available to the
public?
This particular question as written is vague and could relate to a wide variety of programs and
technologies. The Police Department is not certain of the exact nature of this question as
written. We remain available to provide answers to more specific questions, or can provide
further information and context at a future meeting of the task force.
DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 66 of 107
1
Jeremy Ogul
From:Margaret Baker <mbakerdrph@gmail.com>
Sent:Friday, June 24, 2022 1:51 PM
To:privacytaskforce@chulavistaca.gov
Cc:Sophia Rodriguez
Subject:Resources and Updates for June 27 Privacy Task Force meeting
Attachments:Letter to CV Tech & Privacy Task Force_2022-04-25.pdf; Revised Surveillance and Community
Safety Ordinance_2022-06-18.pdf; Revised Privacy Advisory Commission Ordinance_
2022-06-18-2.pdf
Dear Task Force Members,
Since your first meeting when we presented our letter (See attached), we have continued to work to improve the
language of two proposed ordinances (Also attached):
Surveillance and Community Safety Ordinance
Privacy Advisory Commission Ordinance
These ordinances have been developed with input from numerous groups including TRUST San Diego Coalition, Secure
Justice, and other members of our ad hoc community group.
As we suggested in a prior email, we highly recommend that you to take time in an upcoming meeting to invite
representatives from TRUST SD and Secure Justice organizations to present and answer your questions about their on-
the-ground work and experience initiating and implementing surveillance ordinances in their respective cities of San
Diego and Oakland, CA.
Also, we would like to share the following articles in anticipation of our presentation at your meeting on Monday, June
27, 2022.
Here are some resources and updates on the urgent need to protect privacy and civil liberties:
“Cities turn to privacy boards to rebuild trust” (Sarah Wray, Cities Today June 9, 2022) https://cities-
today.com/cities-turn-to-privacy-boards-to-rebuild-trust/
“Lawsuit settles debate: California police share drivers’ location data out of state is illegal” (Cody Delaney,
inewsource June 3, 2022) https://inewsource.org/2022/06/03/lawsuit-california-police-share-drivers-location-
illegal/?utm_medium=email&mc_cid=aa5e6ad43e&mc_eid=3c2e65051c
"Privacy concerns still surround Chula Vista's contract with Motorola” (Amita Sharma, KPBS May 27,
2022) https://www.kpbs.org/news/local/2022/05/27/privacy-concerns-still-surround-chula-vistas-contract-
with-motorola-despite-changes
“Police Surveillance and Facial Recognition: Why data privacy is imperative for communities of color”
(Nicol Turner Lee and Caitlin Chin, Brookings Institution April 12,
2022) https://www.brookings.edu/research/police-surveillance-and-facial-recognition-why-data-privacy-
is-an-imperative-for-communities-of-color/?amp
“Pregnancy Panopticon: Abortion Surveillance After Roe” (S.T.O.P. - The Surveillance Technology
Oversight Project May 24, 2022) https://www.stopspying.org/pregnancy-panopticon
Thank you for your hard work and commitment!
Warning:
External
Email
DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 67 of 107
2
Margaret A. Baker, DrPH
mbakerdrph@gmail.com
619-840-0463
South Bay People Power promotes social justice through nonpartisan civic engagement.
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Why Chula Vista MUST Adopt
Surveillance & Privacy Ordinances
1DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 92 of 107
Who are we?
Formed in December 2020, the Stop CVPD Surveillance Ad Hoc Group first
convened in response to the revelation that CVPD had been sharing Automated
License Plate Recognition data with ICE, CBP, and other immigration enforcement
agencies for years.
We asked: How could a “Welcoming City” collect and share surveillance
data with ICE?
Over time, we found that surveillance technology in Chula Vista was far more
pervasive and concerning than just ALPR.
2DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 93 of 107
We are…
Advancing Students Forward
AFT 1931 Local -Immigrant Student Support Committee
Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment -
ACCE
Border Angels
Change Begins With ME
Espacio Migrante
Indivisible San Diego Persist
Oakland Privacy
Partnership for the Advancement of New Americans
(PANA)
Pillars of the Community
Rise Up San Diego
San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium
Secure Justice
Showing Up for Racial Justice -San Diego (SURJ-SD)
South Bay People Power
Take Action San Diego
Tech Lead San Diego
Tech Workers Coalition San Diego
Think Dignity
TRUST SD (Transparent and Responsible Use of
Surveillance Technology San Diego) Coalition
USD Center for Digital Civil Society
USD Immigration Law Society
USD Values Institute
US-Mexico Border Program, American Friends Service
Committee
We The People SD
3DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 94 of 107
How are communities dealing with complex issues &
constantly changing technology?
Using multiple tools:
●Permanent oversight body -includes community & experts
●Surveillance use ordinance -details process & rules
●Surveillance use policies for each technology -review, adopt as ordinances
●Regular reporting, policy updates & recommendations (Surveillance Impact
Reports, Surveillance Use Policies, Notification, Review, Annual Reports)
●Informed votes by City Council -based on Privacy Advisory Commission
recommendations & public input
●Chief Privacy Officer or Inspector General -with more authority
4DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 95 of 107
5
Over 20 jurisdictions in the US have
adopted surveillance technology
privacy and oversight ordinances.
Chula Vista must do the same!
DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 96 of 107
Chula Vista’s diversity makes it unique:
>60% self-identify as Hispanic/Latino
<17% self-identify as White alone (no other rac/eth)
Cross-border family & economic ties
6
“On a per capita basis, they're probably the most or one of
the most surveilled cities in the country,” said Brian Hofer,
executive director of the Oakland-based privacy advocacy
group Secure Justice.”
“Chula Vista’s location adds federal surveillance to the mix.
The city is just seven miles from the Mexico border, which
opens it up to a network of monitoring by the nation’s largest
law enforcement agency —the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection.”
”Border residents may never know that their information is
being collected, but essentially, the government is able to put
together a map of people's movements, either through
incident times in which they're crossing the border itself, but
also traveling through border communities,” said Shaw Drake,
who serves as policy counsel for the ACLU’s Border Rights
Center. “And so really, towns like Chula Vista, across the
border, are subjected to more surveillance technology than
anywhere else in the country.”
DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 97 of 107
Privacy and Surveillance Ordinances for Chula Vista
1.Privacy Advisory Commission Ordinance:Establishes an independent
body to oversee and enforce the approval, acquisition, use, and oversight
process.
1.Surveillance and Community Safety Ordinance:Lays out a detailed,
enforceable process for all phases of the approval, acquisition, use, and
oversight of all City surveillance technology, existing or proposed.
7DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 98 of 107
Privacy Advisory Commission
Membership:
●9 members, at least 6 Chula Vista
residents
●Appointed by Mayor, confirmed by City
Council
●Demonstrated interest in privacy rights
●Representative areas:
○Attorney/legal (at least 1)
○Auditor/accountant (1)
○IT/digital security (1)
○Open government/transparency (1)
○Equity-focused, most impacted
communities (at least 4)8
Duties:
●Advise the City on best practices to protect
privacy rights in connection with acquisition & use
of surveillance technology
●Conduct meetings & public forums & receive
public input on the subject matter
●Review Surveillance Impact Reports &
Surveillance Use Policies & make
recommendations to the City prior to proposals
for surveillance technology
●Submit annual reports, analysis, &
recommendations to the City Council regarding
the City’s use of surveillance technology
Independent civilian body to oversee process and make informed
recommendations to the City Council
DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 99 of 107
Privacy and Surveillance Ordinances for Chula Vista
1.Privacy Advisory Commission Ordinance:Establishes an independent
body to oversee and enforce the approval, acquisition, use, and oversight
process.
1.Surveillance and Community Safety Ordinance:Establishes a detailed,
enforceable process for all phases of the approval, acquisition, use, and
oversight of all City surveillance technology, existing or proposed.
9DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 100 of 107
Notification & Acquisition Process
Surveillance Impact Report means a publicly released
written report including at a minimum the following:
●Description
●Purpose
●Location
●Impact
●Mitigations
●Data Types and Sources
●Data Security
●Fiscal Cost
●Third-Party Dependence
●Alternatives
●Track Record
Surveillance Use Policy means a publicly released and
legally enforceable policy for use of the surveillance
technology that at a minimum specifies the following:
●Purpose
●Authorized Use
●Data Collection
●Data Access
●Data Protection
●Data Retention
●Public Access
●Third Party Data Sharing
●Auditing and Oversight
●Maintenance
Detailed, enforceable process for all phases of the approval, acquisition, use, and
oversight of all city surveillance technology
10DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 101 of 107
Ongoing Audit & Reporting Requirements
Annual Surveillance Report means a written report concerning a specific
surveillance technology that includes all the following:
●How the surveillance technology was used
●Whether and how often data was shared with outside entities
●Where the surveillance technology was deployed geographically
●A summary of community complaints or concerns about the surveillance technology
●An analysis of the use policy & whether it is adequate in protecting civil rights & privacy
●The results of any internal audits and information about any violations of the Surveillance Use Policy
●Information about any data breaches or other unauthorized access to the data
●Information, including crime statistics, that helps the community assess whether the
technology has been effective
●Statistics and information about public records act requests regarding the surveillance technology, including response rates
●Total annual costs, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and source of funding in the coming year
●Any requested modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy and a detailed basis for the request.11DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 102 of 107
What can the Task Force do?
●Expand the Task Force work plan to achieve your goals for a
comprehensive program that ensures privacy & civil liberties
protections now & for the future;
●Use your knowledge, expertise & legitimacy to recommend a
robust process & multiple tools to deal with complex &
constantly changing technologies;
○Recommend adoption of a Privacy Advisory Commission
Ordinance
○Recommend a Surveillance and Community Safety
Ordinance
12DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 103 of 107
What can the Task Force do?
●Build public trust with a transparent & inclusive process
○Start with agreement on a set of guiding principles;
○Build on existing models, best practices, lessons learned;
○Take the time needed to get it right;
○Facilitate open communication & deliberation with the community, in
particular non-English speakers & other often-marginalized people.
13DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 104 of 107
Selected Resources
ORDINANCES
●City of Oakland
○Oakland Ordinance (final): https://oaklandca.s3.us-west-
1.amazonaws.com/oakca1/groups/cityadministrator/documents/standard/oak070617.pdf
○Oakland Privacy Advisory Commission website (includes ordinance): https://www.oaklandca.gov/boards-
commissions/privacy-advisory-board
●City of San Diego -SD TRUST Ordinance (awaiting final vote by SD City Council)
○Proposed ordinance:
https://sandiegotrust.org/City_of_San_Diego_Proposed_Surveillance_Ordinance_and_Privacy_Commission.p
df
○Ordinances as passed unanimously by SD City Council November 2020: https://sandiegotrust.org/20-
Nov_Surveillance_Privacy_Ordinances.pdf
●“Local Surveillance Oversight Ordinances, February 2021” (White Paper, Samuelson Law, Technology & Public
Policy Clinic at UC Berkeley School of Law) https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Local-
Surveillance-Ordinances-White-Paper.pdf
●“How San Diego's Privacy Law Stacks Up Against 16 Others” (Blog post, Seth Hall March 23, 2021
sandiegoprivacy.org) https://sandiegoprivacy.org/berkley-review-of-surveillance-oversight.html
14DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 105 of 107
Selected Resources (2)
ORGANIZATIONS
●SD TRUST Coalition: https://sandiegotrust.org/
●Oakland Privacy: https://oaklandprivacy.org/
●Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) https://www.eff.org/
●EFF -Street-Level Surveillance explains types of surveillance technologies & privacy issues, including ALPR,
drones, and others https://www.eff.org/issues/street-level-surveillance
●American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU): Community Control Over Police Surveillance (CCOPS) -Guiding Principles
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/ccops_guiding_principles_-_final_1.pdf
●Surveillance Technology Oversight Project (S.T.O.P.) https://www.stopspying.org/
OTHER RESOURCES
●“Cities turn to privacy boards to rebuild trust” (Sarah Wray, Cities Today June 9, 2022) https://cities-today.com/cities-
turn-to-privacy-boards-to-rebuild-trust/
●“Police Surveillance and Facial Recognition: Why data privacy is imperative for communities of color” (Nicol Turner
Lee and Caitlin Chin, Brookings Institution April 12, 2022) https://www.brookings.edu/research/police-surveillance-
and-facial-recognition-why-data-privacy-is-an-imperative-for-communities-of-color/?amp
●“Pregnancy Panopticon: abortion surveillance after Roe” (S.T.O.P., May 24, 2022)
https://www.stopspying.org/pregnancy-panopticon
15DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 106 of 107
Questions?
“Decisions on technology go beyond the narrow term of privacy to
encompass civil liberties and human rights more broadly. Scrutiny
over the effectiveness of solutions and value for money is also
essential. As more advanced technology is deployed in cities in the
police department and beyond, it’s essential that guardrails are in
place, processes are transparent, and citizens have a chance to
participate. Independent oversight boards could soon be an
essential part of urban governance.”
Sarah Wray, Cities Today 6/9/22
16DATE Technology & Privacy Advisory Task Force Agenda Page 107 of 107